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While degraded trust and cohesion within a country are often shown to have large socio-
economic impacts, they can also have dramatic consequences when compliance is required for
collective survival. We illustrate this point in the context of the COVID-19 crisis. Policy re-
sponses all over the world aim to reduce social interaction and limit contagion. Using data on
human mobility and political trust at regional level in Europe, we examine whether the com-
pliance to these containment policies depends on the level of trust in policy makers prior to
the crisis. Using a double difference approach around the time of lockdown announcements,
we find that high-trust regions decrease their mobility related to non-necessary activities
significantly more than low-trust regions. We also exploit country and time variation in
treatment using the daily strictness of national policies. The efficiency of policy stringency
in terms of mobility reduction significantly increases with trust. The trust effect is nonlinear
and increases with the degree of stringency. We assess how the impact of trust on mobility
potentially translates in terms of mortality growth rate.
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“Maybe our biggest strength in Germany is the rational decision-making at the highest level
of government combined with the trust the government enjoys in the population.” (Professor
Hans-Georg, head of virology at University Hospital in Heidelberg).1
1 Introduction
The COVID-19 pandemic has spread rapidly and globally since February-March 2020. Shelter-
in-place and social distancing measures have been enacted or recommended all over the world
to slow down transmission and reduce both the load on the healthcare system and overall
mortality. In this context, the compliance to health policy rules is crucial and may vary with
the local context so that policy measures may not be equally effective in different parts of the
globe. In particular, the way people abide to containment measures may depend on the degree
of confidence in the authorities. Yet little is known about the effect of trust on compliance to
health and safety rules. Trust has received a lot of attention in the economic literature (see the
survey by Algan and Cahuc, 2014) and beyond (e.g., Fukuyama, 1995). Specific forms of trust
are investigated, notably citizens’ trust in institutions and decision-makers, which are shown
to improve regulation efficiency and voluntary compliance to rules and laws.2 Recent social
movements in France (yellow jackets) and elsewhere have also reminded us that a spreading
distrust in institutions can harm social cohesion and economic stability. There are very few
studies investigating the role of trust and compliance in the face of a massive pandemic.3
Against this background, we exploit regional variation in political trust throughout Europe to
test whether confidence in authorities prior to the crisis affects the compliance to lockdown
policies, as measured by the change in human mobility. We first provide graphical evidence
then adopt a double difference approach around the time of lockdown announcements. We
also use the daily intensity of policy stringency as a more continuous source of variation in
treatment, both over time and across countries. Most European countries have enacted measures
of varying severity, from strict suppression methods (including generalized lockdown, enforced
social distancing and the closure of school and non-essential economic activities) to milder
mitigation approach (for instance in the UK at first, and in Sweden throughout the period).
We check whether trust improves the efficiency of policy stringency. We combine three main
data sources: COVID-19 mobility reports from Google, trust data from the European Social
Survey (ESS) and policy stringency from the Oxford COVID-19 Government Response Tracker.
1https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/international/world-news/a-german-exception-why
-the-countrys-coronavirus-death-rate-is-low/articleshow/74989886.cms?from=mdr
2This literature highlights the relationship between general trust and many outcomes such as trade or economic
development. Political trust and civic norms in particular allow cooperation when large-scale collective action is
needed. They improve citizen involvement and governmental performance (Knack, 2002, Helliwell and Putnam,
1995, LaPorta et al., 1997, Knack and Keefer, 1997), tax compliance (e.g. Knack and Keefer, 1997, Scholz and
Lubell, 1998) or the decision to report crimes (Tyler, 2006).
3Some studies examine trust in the health system (Ozawa and Sripad, 2013) and how it affects vaccine
hesitancy or the use of healthcare (e.g. Woskie and Fallah, 2019). Blair et al. (2017) provides an original account
of how people who distrusted government were less compliant with Ebola control policies.
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We find that the decline in mobility around mid-March 2020 is significantly stronger in high-
trust regions. We interpret it as the result of better compliance to national health policies in
regions that demonstrated higher levels of trust in policy makers prior to the crisis. The effect
is especially strong for non-necessary activities (recreation, work and transport) compared to
going to the grocery or to the drugstore, i.e. essential activities allowed by most of the national
shelter-in-place policies. The effect of trust is similar whether we adopt a simple difference over
the lockdown period of March 2020 or a difference-in-difference approach, and whether we use
the ESS data on trust in politicians or alternative measure (ESS satisfaction in governments or
Eurobarometer trust in government). Next, we observe a significant impact of the stringency
of lockdown measures on mobility in European regions but the diminishing effect is larger
in high-trust regions. The overall effect of trust coincides on average with this mediating
effect on the efficacy of policy stringency. Using a continuous measure of stringency allows
detecting nonlinearities: the effect of trust increases with the degree of stringency and we find
no evidence of a sign reversal at very low stringency levels (i.e. as would happen if low-trust
regions self-isolated more than the rest because they doubt the ability of the government to
respond appropriately). Finally, we assess how the impact of trust on mobility translates in
terms of death growth rate.
2 Data Sources
To analyze the impact of trust on mobility and, subsequently, on mortality, we mobilize several
types of data: the Google mobility index, trust from various sources, the Oxford measure of
policy stringency, official information on COVID-related deaths and control variables.
2.1 Mobility
We use the human mobility index by Chan et al. (2020), constructed from the Google COVID-
19 mobility reports. These reports aggregate anonymized sets of data from users’ mobile device
Location History. The mobility index measures how visits to, or length of stay at, different
types of location change over time compared to a baseline period corresponding to January
3-February 6, 2020.4 There are six location categories: (i) retail and recreation, (ii) grocery
and pharmacy, (iii) parks (public gardens, dog parks, beaches, etc.), (iv) transit stations (public
transport hubs such as subway, bus, train stations), (v) workplaces and (vi) residential areas.
For the first five categories, one can expect a significant drop in mobility during the COVID-19
pandemic while the index for private residence, i.e. the length of staying at home, is supposed
to increase. Human mobility is tracked by Google daily and in a consistent manner across
131 countries for the period from February 16 to April 5, 2020. For a subset of countries, the




Figure 1a reports mobility at the country level using the index for “retail and recreation”, but
very similar patterns are obtained with the other activities. The horizontal axis represents
the February 16 - April 5 period with March 1 taken as day 0. Early calls for self-isolation
were made in Italy, the first European country affected by COVID-19, and we see a decline
in mobility in the first days of March for this country. The first strict official lockdown was
enacted on March 9 in Italy. Most European countries tend to follow, with a sharp drop in
mobility around mid-March and a lower (containment-level) plateau reached within 10 days.
There are a few exception (notably a long hesitation in the UK and the mild mitigation policy
in Sweden throughout the period). Note that the cross-country variance in mobility is relatively
small before lockdowns begin and increase enormously afterwards due to the variety of country
responses.
2.2 Trust and Policy Stringency
Trust. To measure trust at the regional level, we use the 8th wave of the European Social
Survey (ESS), which asks respondents about their trust in politicians in the country on a scale
of 0 to 10 (with 0 meaning “No trust at all” and 10 “Complete trust”). For estimations, we
aggregate this information at the regional level by calculating the share of respondents whose
score is above the country mean. We could use a cutoff that is common to all the countries, such
as a fixed score of 5 on the scale – but our aim is to capture regional variation within country
especially, which would not be possible with a common threshold (for instance, most of the
individual scores are above 5 in Scandinavian countries). Note that our conclusions are robust
to alternative ways of aggregating trust at regional level, in particular when using the share
of scores above the country median or directly the regional average trust score. As robustness
checks, we also use a question from the ESS on individual satisfaction with the work of the
national government, as well as the political trust question from the Eurobarometer (the Flash
Eurobarometer 472 records the share of those who tend to trust their national government at
the regional level).
Note that we use trust measures that are prior to the COVID crisis and hence not affected
by the way different governments have managed this crisis.5 In that sense, we aim to grasp
profound differences across European regions in terms of civic norms and trust in the political
system. Growing evidence suggest that trust attitudes, like other cultural traits, can persist
for surprisingly long periods of time at national and sub-national levels (Bjørnskov, 2007), with
regional differences shaped by past political and social developments (Tabellini, 2010). At
the same time, we use relatively recent data (2016 for ESS and 2018 for the Eurobarometer)
since part of the answer on trust is context-dependent and reflect confidence in the recent
governments.
5Ongoing research aims to assess how citizens’ trust in the government respond to information about the
policy response to the pandemic (Khan et al., 2020). Past studies show that effective public intervention to
contain Ebola outbreaks might have increased trust in authorities (Flückiger et al., 2019).
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Source: Google mobility data and stringency data from Oxford COVID-19 Government Response Tracker (OxCGRT).
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Policy Stringency. We use data on policy stringency from the Oxford COVID-19 Govern-
ment Response Tracker (OxCGRT). This tracker implemented by the University of Oxford’s
Blavatnik School of Government systematically collects information on the measures taken by
governments to tackle the pandemic since February 2020.6 OxCGRT is based on publicly avail-
able information on 13 indicators of government response (policies such as school closures, bans
on public gatherings or travel, etc., and financial indicators such as fiscal or monetary mea-
sures). Each indicator is rescaled to get a score between 0 and 100 (100 representing the highest
degree of strictness/restriction). The composite stringency index we use is the daily average
value of these indices on a 0-100 scale. Hale et al. (2020) describe the data in detail.7 In Europe,
stringency increases as the number of COVID-19 cases rises exponentially around mid-March.
Figure 1b reports country-specific patterns, which mirror national mobility trends and hence
indicate the effectiveness of policy measures overall.
2.3 COVID-related Deaths and Control Variables
After combining mobility, ESS trust data and policy stringency, our final sample (with non-
missing values in key variables) includes 233 regions in 19 European countries over a period of
50 days starting from February 16, 2020.8 Our estimations additionally control for the number
of COVID-19 related deaths reported on the day before, at the country level, as this may
alter individual mobility behavior. The data on COVID-19 deaths is obtained from the daily
updates of the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC).9. We also include
regional characteristics, namely the 2019 unemployment rate (taken from EUROSTAT data)
and the population density (number of people per square kilometer in the region, taken from
EUROSTAT for 2018 and completed by 2016/2017 ESS data when missing).
3 Empirical Approaches and Results
We opt for a step-by-step presentation where we describe the empirical approach and directly
provide the corresponding results. We start with the direct effect of trust on mobility, ultimately
using the timing of lockdown policies for a difference-in-difference approach confronting high
and low trust regions. We then use policy stringency as a more time-varying treatment variable
to examine the effect of trust. While our main outcome is human mobility, we also provide
suggestive evidence on the potential impact of trust on the mortality growth rate.
6https://www.bsg.ox.ac.uk/research/research-projects/coronavirus-government-response-tracker
7They show that the positive correlation between stringency and the reported number of COVID-19 cases in
early March is driven by Asian countries and tends to disappear as many more countries get infected.
8With Eurobarometer trust data, the sample is slightly different, with 171 regions in 18 European countries




3.1 The Direct Effect of Political Trust on Mobility
Graphical evidence. We first check the direct role of political trust as a shifter of the overall
mobility of European citizens around March 2020. In Figure 2, we begin with graphical evidence
using regional mobility trends for non-essential activities – likely to be impacted by policy
responses to the pandemic (recreation, work, transport) – or, symmetrically, the index of time
spent at home. In each graph, we use a local polynomial fit of the daily variation across
regions of Europe and its 95% confidence interval (CI). The horizontal axis represents dates
with March 1 taken as day 0. We distinguish two groups: regions with an average trust score
above national average (‘trust’) or below (‘distrust’). Note that results are very similar whether
we use national mean or median. The vertical dashed line represents the average lockdown date
in Europe. Before that point, the variance in mobility across European regions is small while
it increases much afterwards, reflecting the diversity of behavior and policy responses across
Europe as depicted in Figures 1a and 1b.
Figure 2: Daily Mobility and Political Trust (ESS):
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Source: authors' calculations based on Google mobility data and ESS data on trust in politicians. Areas represent the 95% CI of average daily mobility across 
European regions, weighted by 1/number of regions in the corresponding country. Distrust indicates regions, within each country, with trust level below country average.
We see that the relative mobility indices in late February and early March is close to zero,
indicating no difference compared to the prior benchmark period (Jan. 3 - Feb. 6). Most
importantly, low and high trust groups show very similar trends and only tiny differences in
mobility levels at this early stage. We then observe the sharp reduction in mobility (or increase
in time spent at home – last graph) following national lockdown measures or recommendations.
This drop is more pronounced in the group of regions characterized by higher levels of political
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trust, and the difference persists until the end of the period of observation. It is also suggestive
to see that this pattern mainly concerns non-necessary activities (see appendix Figure A.1a).10
With rare exceptions, a similar pattern is found when looking at each country separately (see
Figure A.2 in the appendix). It is also confirmed when using alternative measures of appreci-
ation of the political system, including the ESS question on satisfaction with the work of the
national government (Figure A.3) and the question on trust in the national government from
the Eurobarometer (Figure A.4).
Basic estimations. Given the graphical evidence above, it seems reasonable to start with a
simple estimation on the post-lockdown period to characterize the mobility shift induced by
trust. Using regional data for the period from March 15 to April 5, we regress the mobility of
region i at day t as follows:
Mobilityit = α






c + εit. (1)
The regional trust level, Trusti, is a continuous measure, i.e. the proportion of people with
trust scores above national average.11 We control for day dummies θTt , which capture common
time trends (for instance the information available to all European citizens on the pandemic
situation at any point in time). We also include country dummies µTc , which account among
other things for national differences in the overall contagion level (e.g. an early start in Italy),
for different national healthcare systems or for long-term trends in political trust at the country
level (along other cultural differences). We also control for the number of people deceased
from COVID-19 on the previous day, Deathit−1, which reflects the degree of exposure and the
urgency to comply with containment measures.12 We also include a vector Xi of local factors
comprising the local unemployment rate (which mechanically impact on work-related mobility)
and urban density (associated with the degree of exposure).
Results are reported in Table 1 for the “retail/recreation” mobility index. All models convey
that the mobility of citizens living in high trust regions decreases more than in other regions
(βT < 0), which we interpret as a higher compliance with national policies encouraging self-
isolation. Model (A) only accounts for country and time effects. Note that omitted variables
may affect both trust and mobility. For instance, if citizens living in rural areas are older, less
mobile and traditionally more in confidence with the political system, then our effect would be
upward biased. Adding controls Xi in model (B) should attenuate this concern. The estimate
of interest slightly decreases but not significantly so. Another potential issue is the fact that
10For visits to the grocery or pharmacy, mobility declines as well but not as much, and there is logically less
of a trust and compliance issue so that there is no observable difference between trust groups. Results for visits
to the park or other outdoor places are also more ambiguous.
11As explained, we aim to fully exploit regional variation in this way but our conclusions are unchanged if we
use alternative regional trust aggregates or we opt for low and high trust dummies as in the graphs above.
12Mortality figures are at country level. Data at regional level are not systematically available for all the coun-
tries. In alternative unreported estimations, we control for the intensity of Google search for “COVID+death”
at regional level to proxy the local intensity of concern regarding the risks associated with the pandemic. Our
main estimates are barely changed.
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we are pooling regional information from many European countries while the number of regions
varies by country. To avoid giving more weight to a country with numerous regions, model (C)
reweights each observation by the inverse of the number of regions in the corresponding country.
The trust effect is again very similar.
Table 1: Effect of Trust on Mobility
Basic estimation Difference in Difference
(A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F) (G) (H)
Trust -7.747*** -6.542*** -6.759*** -1.890 1.014 -0.017
(1.153) (1.201) (1.442) (2.822) (2.917) (2.827)
Post × Trust -7.550** -9.626*** -8.136** -8.481*** -6.857**
(3.022) (3.112) (3.231) (3.099) (3.250)
# daily deaths (t-1) -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.003*** -0.014*** -0.013*** -0.011*** -0.013*** -0.011***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Regional controls Xi:
Unemp. Rate 0.128*** 0.020* 0.440*** 0.463*** -0.068 -0.170*
(0.067) (0.069) (0.097) (0.095) (0.159) (0.101)
Population density -0.002*** -0.001*** -0.000 -0.000 0.001** 0.002***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Observations 5,349 4,909 4,909 8,258 7,656 7,656 7,656 7,656
R-squared 0.843 0.855 0.823 0.870 0.872 0.881 0.881 0.891
Day FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No
Region FE n.a. n.a. n.a. No No No Yes Yes
Region reweighting No No Yes No No Yes No Yes
Post×Xi n.a. n.a. n.a. No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Elasticities with respect to trust:
Mobility -0.085 -0.072 -0.074 -0.083 -0.105 -0.089 -0.093 -0.075
Death growth rate -0.096 -0.081 -0.084 -0.094 -0.119 -0.101 -0.105 -0.085
Note: authors’ estimation of Google mobility index (retail and recreation) on trust data (ESS), lagged daily deaths (European
Centre for Disease Prevention and Control) and regional control variables (unemployment and population density), for the period
March 15-April 5 (basic estimation) or March 1-April 5 (double difference). Post is a dummy indicating the period starting March
15 (average lockdown date). Region reweighting: observations are weighted by (1/# of regions in the corresponding country). Ro-
bust standard errors in parentheses. Significance level: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Difference-in-difference estimations. To go further, we proceed with a difference-in-difference
approach. We carry out estimations on the period March 1-April 5, using a treatment period
defined as Post = 1(date > March15). National lockdown announcements have taken place in
a narrow time window around March 15, as previously seen in Figures 1a and 1b. Note that
the next results are very similar if we rather adopt country-specific lockdown dates.13 The first
specification is a natural follow-up of the basic model:
Mobilityit = α
T +βTPost×Trusti+ρTTrusti+γTDeathit−1+δTXi+ηTPost×Xi+θTt +µTc +εit.
(2)
Note that Post alone is absorbed by day dummies θTt . The coefficient β
T is the double differ-
ence estimator while ρT represents the long-lasting differences (constant selection bias) between
regions.14 A second type of specification fully acknowledges the panel nature of our sample of
13These are the times of official lockdown enactment, when available, or the date of national lockdown recom-
mendation (for Finland, Sweden, Netherlands, Hungary), as reported at: www.bbc.com/news/world-52103747.
14The parallel trend is verified informally by visual inspections of Figure 2 for the late February-early March
period. Formal tests confirm it using placebo regressions carried out over the whole sample of regions or for each
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regions and replaces µTc by region fixed effects µ
T
i (Trusti is absorbed by the latter here):
Mobilityit = α
T +βTPost×Trusti + γTDeathit−1 + δTXi + ηTPost×Xi + θTt +µTi + εit. (3)
Results of the double difference estimations are reported in Table 1. They confirm that high-
trust regions decrease their mobility significantly more than low-trust regions. Model (D) con-
trols only for lagged deaths, country fixed effects and time dummies. Model (E) includes the
set of controls Xi and their interaction with Post (as per equation 2) Model (F) checks the
sensitivity to the region reweighting procedure discussed above. Model (G) corresponds to the
panel double difference estimation (equation 3) and model (H) is its reweighted version. In all
these cases, the estimate of βT is negative and of a relatively similar order of magnitude as
the trust effect obtained from basic estimations on the lockdown period. In model (D)-(F), the
coefficient on Trusti is not significant, indicating no difference in mobility between trust groups
prior to the lockdown period. In most models, the number of COVID-related deaths on the
previous day is associated with reduced mobility.
The penultimate row reports mobility elasticities with respect to trust, calculated as deviation
from the mean (similar results are obtained using log-log specifications after transformation
to avoid negative mobility values). It ranges from .072 to .105 across models. Note that the
European average trust is .41 and the standard deviation across all regions is .10.15 Hence, a
one standard-deviation increase in regional trust (a 25% variation around the mean) leads to a
decrease in mobility between 1.8% and 2.6% across models.
The above results are obtained for mobility related to recreational activities. We replicate the
main estimations for the other mobility indices. Results in Table A.1 of the appendix convey
very similar conclusions: the drop in mobility associated to work and transport, and the increase
in time spent at home, are significantly larger in high-trust regions.
3.2 Policy Stringency and Trust
Graphical evidence. We now explore a more time-continuous variation in the intensity of
lockdown policies using daily stringency measures at country level. We start with graphical
evidence. Figure 3 reports the negative relationship between mobility and policy stringency,
derived from time and regional variation in Europe (as represented by 95% CI). It suggests
that for all non-essential activities, stricter lockdown regulations have contributed to drastically
reduce human movements and, hopefully, to limit contagion. In high-trust regions, the mobility
trends are shifted downward by a significant margin while, symmetrical, time at home (last
graph) is shifted upward. The role of trust is nonlinear: the gap between trust groups increase
with the stringency degree. Finally, these patterns are not so pronounced for necessary activities
country separately.
15The within-country standard deviation varies between .05 and .20, i.e. between 10% and 50% the national
mean trust levels. Similar dispersions are obtained using regional trust scores rather than the share of citizens
above country mean. Note also that the 90th percentile of the European distribution of region average trust
scores is 2.32 times the 10th percentile.
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Source: authors' calculations based on Google mobility data, stringency level from Oxford COVID-19 Government Response Tracker (OxCGRT), and ESS data on trust
in politicians. Areas represent the 95% CI of average daily mobility across European regions, weighted by 1/number of regions in the corresponding country. Distrust
indicates regions, within each country, with trust level below country average.
(see Figure A.1b in the online Appendix), even though policy-defying attitudes by low-trust
regions are detected also for these activities at very high stringency levels (especially for visits
to the park, which are more restricted than grocery/drugstore visits in some countries).
Empirical approach and results. The double difference approach used pre and post-lockdown
time variation and assumed an average policy pressure. We now exploit a time-continuous
change in policies using the daily index of stringency, which also captures country heterogeneity
in the strictness of lockdown measures across Europe. Estimations are carried out as before on
daily regional mobility from March 1 to April 5 and using the same control variables. Different
specifications are written as:
Mobilityit = α






with Z = βS0 Stringencyit (4)
Z = (βS0 + β
S
1 Trusti)Stringencyit + β
S
2 Trusti (5)





with βS1i = β
HS
1 HighStringencyit + β
LS
1 LowStringencyit.
The first model, in equation (4), simply aims to gauge the average effect of stringency. Results
are presented in Table 2. As expected, higher stringency is associated with less mobility (column
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a) and this result is not sensitive to region reweighting (column b).
Equation (5) captures how political trust may increase the stringency impact on mobility. Re-
sults in Table 2 go as follows. Trust significantly increases the diminishing effect of stringency
(column c): high trust regions tend to comply more to policy stringency on average. This effect
holds with region reweighting (column d). As in the double difference approach, the coefficient
on Trusti is not significant (no mobility difference between trust groups prior to the enforce-
ment of lockdown policies). We also suggest a variant of this model where Trusti is replaced
by region fixed effects (as for the panel version of the double difference approach). It leads to
similar results, with larger estimates of the coefficient of interest βS1 (columns e and f).
The elasticity of mobility with respect to trust, calculated around mean stringency and mean
trust level, ranges between .054 and .087 across models (c)-(f). For the most flexible models
(d) and (f), this average elasticity fully coincides with the direct effect of trust obtained by the
corresponding difference-in-difference model (i.e. with region fixed effects). We also replicate
estimations for all types of activities (Table A.2 in the online appendix). The mediating effect
of trust on the efficacy of stringency is significant for the decrease in non-essential activities
(recreation, work and transport) and for the increase in time spent at home. Elasticities range
from .077 to 0.111 and broadly coincide with the direct trust effect.
Finally, equation (6) aims to test the nonlinearity observed in Figure 3. In Table 2, specification
without (column g) or with region reweighting (column h) both convey that the impact of trust
is larger at high stringency level. Equality tests reject the null with a p-value near zero in both
cases. This result confirms the increasing gap between high and low trust groups seen in Figure
3. We also formally test that there is no sign reversal at very low stringency levels. This could
happen in situations where low-trust regions self-isolate more than the rest because they doubt
the ability of the government to respond appropriately to the crisis.16
Potential limitations. A number of papers have studied the role of trust with respect to
policy design and the degree of law-abidingness of the citizens (Algan and Cahuc, 2009). In
our context, the endogeneity of policy stringency to the country level of political trust can be
questioned. As a merely suggestive check, we regress stringency on trust and standard controls
(unemployment, population density) at country level and find no effect of trust on stringency
(p-value: .98). Most importantly, even if national policy stringency was endogenous to trust,
our approach above relies primarily on region-time variation in trust (models c-d), with country
fixed effect controlling for differences in overall levels of stringency and trust across countries,
or just on time variation within regions (models e-f).17
16This interpretation is actually related to very recent studies on political orientation in the US, showing that
Democrats tend not to follow the President’s directive and exert more social distancing than Republicans (e.g.
Allcott et al., 2020 or Painter and Qiu, 2020).
17Another potential limitation is the fact that stringency is measured at national level. Given the emergency,
lockdown policies have been implemented nationwide in most countries, even in federal states such as Austria,
Belgium or Germany. Stringency may however vary (e.g. severe restrictions in Bavaria). Further work could
explore regional policy measures but more disaggregated trust data would be required for identification.
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Table 2: Effect of Stringency on Mobility
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h)
Stringency -0.510*** -0.493*** -0.407*** -0.376*** -0.385*** -0.358*** -0.417*** -0.382***
(0.014) (0.015) (0.024) (0.025) (0.025) (0.028) (0.018) (0.018)
Stringency × Trust -0.080* -0.091** -0.128*** -0.120**
(0.044) (0.046) (0.049) (0.054)
Trust 0.231 1.007
(3.610) (3.755)
Stringency (high) × Trust -0.110*** -0.101***
(0.018) (0.018)
Stringency (low) × Trust 0.071*** -0.025
(0.024) (0.026)
# daily deaths (t-1) -0.025*** -0.022*** -0.022*** -0.019*** -0.022*** -0.019*** -0.021*** -0.018***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Observations 7,656 7,656 7,656 7,656 7,656 7,656 7,656 7,656
R-squared 0.894 0.898 0.896 0.901 0.904 0.911 0.896 0.901
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
Region FE No No No No Yes Yes No No
Regional controls Xi Yes Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
Region reweighting No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Elasticities with respect to trust:
Mobility -0.054 -0.062 -0.087 -0.082
Death growth rate -0.062 -0.070 -0.099 -0.092
Note: authors’ estimation of Google mobility index (retail and recreation) on stringency index (Oxford COVID-19 Government Response
Tracker) and trust data (ESS). All estimations include lagged daily deaths (European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control), day
fixed effects and, as indicated, either regional control variables (unemployment and population density) and country fixed effects or regional
fixed effects. Estimations are conducted on the period from March 1 to April 5, 2020. Region reweighting: observations are weighted by
(1/# of regions in the corresponding country). Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance level: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
3.3 Trust and COVID-19 Death Growth Rate
We provide suggestive evidence on how trust translates into a slower epidemic growth through
mobility reduction. Clearly, it is not possible to find a relationship between current mobility
and future deaths, as both are highly correlated with the current mortality level. However,
it is possible to establish how the upcoming death growth rate responds to the instantaneous
mobility index, reflecting the efficiency of lockdown policies. Note that other factors are excluded
(in March-April, none of the European countries had reached a level of infection leading to
collective immunization). Our calculations are purely indicative given the medical uncertainty
on key parameters.
Using international data, Soucy et al. (2020) also point to an impact of the reduction in human
mobility on the infection growth rate. They find that a 10% decrease in relative mobility in
the second week of March was associated with a 11.8% relative decrease in the average daily
death growth rate in the fourth week of March, i.e. an elasticity of 1.18. We obtain similar
results when focusing on Europe. We also suggest an alternative calculation based on daily
mobility data throughout March and until April 5, fully exploiting the variation in containment
policies over time and across countries. For each day, we compare the current cumulated death
toll attributed to COVID-19 to that of 2 weeks ahead, and divide the corresponding growth
rate by 14 to obtain a daily upcoming death growth rate. This growth rate is regressed on the
instantaneous mobility index, day fixed effects and country fixed effects.
We find a significant estimate of .021 (std. err. of .0016). It yields an elasticity of death growth
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rate with respect to mobility of 1.19, which is very similar to Soucy et al. (2020). We combine
it with our previous estimates to compute an elasticity of death growth rate with respect to
trust, systematically reported in the last row of all the previous tables. Take for instance the
difference-in-difference approach with regional fixed effects as baseline model. For recreational
mobility, we find an elasticity of .110 in this case, i.e. doubling trust would lead to a 11%
decrease in the mortality growth rate. This corresponds to a decrease from 39.1% to 34.7% in
the median daily death growth rate, i.e. a doubling in the number of deaths in 2.88 days rather
than 2.56 days. To get a notion of how it translates in terms of death toll, note that there was a
total of 2,000 cumulated deaths mid-March in Europe and around 90,000 by mid-April (ECDC
figures). Consider a benchmark variation of +25% in trust (1 standard deviation): with the
baseline model, this leads to a 2.8% decrease in the mortality growth rate and 4,435 less deaths
by April 15. Robustness checks confirm these orders of magnitude.18
4 Conclusion
Trust in governments is an important determinant of citizens’ compliance with public health
policies, especially in times of crisis. This relationship, rarely studied in the literature, deserves
a particular attention in the present context of global pandemic. COVID-19 has forced govern-
ments to take drastic measures all over the world. Lockdown policies are often very constraining
and must receive a large support by the population to be efficient – this support is not guaran-
teed and certainly not homogenous. Using mobility data at regional level in Europe, we show
that higher political trust is associated with a larger reduction in non-essential mobility follow-
ing the implementation of containment policies in March 2020. This effect is interpreted as a
higher level of compliance to national directives in high-trust regions. It coincides in magnitude
with the effect of trust on the efficacy of policy stringency.
Persistent differences in regional attitudes towards national policy makers are important and
should be taken into account by authorities for policy design and especially for the implemen-
tation of nationwide emergency policies. This is relevant in the present context for both the
enforcement of lockdown policies and the necessary roll back of these measures at the time we
write these lines. Notice that regional diversity captures only one dimension of the heterogeneity
in civic values within countries. Further research should attempt to exploit more local or indi-
vidual data on mobility and compliance to health policies such as social distancing measures.19
The fact that variation in trust at a broad regional level already yields significant differences in
mobility responses to recent health policies is striking. New research could go further to iden-
tify relevant social groups and connect this issue with the work on conflicts. Recent episodes of
social unrest (e.g. the yellow jackets in France) point to groups that show more socio-economic
18A two-week lag for the death growth rate calculation is the average known duration between infection and
public report. Results are similar when using 1 or 3 weeks. Robustness checks also include taking out countries
with less than 100 cumulated deaths at the end of the period.
19The conclusion of the present paper is corroborated by a survey on Danish citizen showing that the ‘willingness
to distance’ depends on political trust, among other determinants (Olsen and Hjorth, 2020).
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vulnerability and less adherence to the political system (Algan et al., 2019).
The present paper also relies on policy stringency. Much remains to be known about the
causes and consequences of the great diversity of national policy responses to the pandemic.
All the more so as many governments will be accountable to their population regarding the
management of this crisis and the chosen tradeoff between death toll, economic downturn and
other consequences of the lockdown in terms of health and mental health.
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Appendix








(i) (ii) (iii) (iv)
Basic model
Trust -5.295*** -4.712*** -9.404*** 2.321***
(1.478) (1.056) (1.347) (0.467)
Difference in difference
Trust 1.014 1.775 -2.768 -0.283
(2.917) (1.983) (2.362) (0.850)
Post × Trust -9.626*** -9.873*** -10.140*** 3.951***
(3.112) (2.140) (2.629) (0.925)
Difference in difference (with regional FE)
Post × Trust -8.481*** -9.248*** -9.239*** 3.778***
(3.099) (2.106) (2.536) (0.905)
Observations 7,656 7,636 7,351 7,153
Mean mobility index -37.4 -27.6 -36.2 11.1
Elasticities with respect to trust (DD model with regional FE):
Mobility -0.093 -0.137 -0.105 -0.062
Death growth rate -0.105 -0.155 -0.118 -0.070
Note: authors’ estimation of Google mobility index (for different types of activity as indicated) or index of time
spent in private residence on trust data (ESS). All estimations include lagged daily deaths (European Centre
for Disease Prevention and Control), regional control variables (unemployment and population density), coun-
try fixed effects and day fixed effects. Estimations are conducted on the period from March 1 to April 5, 2020.
Post is a dummy indicating the period starting March 15 (average lockdown date). Robust standard errors in
parentheses. Significance level: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1








(i) (ii) (iii) (iv)
Stringency -0.385*** -0.178*** -0.260*** 0.052***
(0.025) (0.020) (0.021) (0.008)
Stringency × Trust -0.128*** -0.121*** -0.111*** 0.034**
(0.049) (0.036) (0.041) (0.015)
Observations 7,656 7,636 7,351 7,153
R-squared 0.904 0.905 0.922 0.906
Mean mobility index -37.4 -27.6 -36.2 11.1
Elasticities with respect to trust:
Mobility -0.087 -0.082 -0.076 0.023
Death growth rate -0.099 -0.093 -0.086 0.026
Note: authors’ estimations of Google mobility index (for different types of activity as indicated) or in-
dex of time spent in private residence on stringency index (Oxford COVID-19 Government Response
Tracker) and trust data (ESS). All estimations include lagged daily deaths (European Centre for Dis-
ease Prevention and Control), regional fixed effects and day fixed effects. Estimations are conducted
on the period from March 1 to April 5, 2020. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance
level: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Source: authors' calculations based on Google mobility data and ESS data on trust in politicians. Areas represent the 95% CI of average daily mobility across European regions,








































Source: authors' calculations based on Google mobility data, stringency level from Oxford COVID-19 Government Response Tracker (OxCGRT), and ESS data on trust
in politicians. Areas represent the 95% CI of average daily mobility across European regions, weighted by 1/number of regions in the corresponding country. Distrust
indicates regions, within each country, with trust level below country average.
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Figure A.3: Daily Mobility and Political Trust (Eurobarometer):
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Source: authors' calculations based on Google mobility data and EUROBAROMETER data on trust in government. Areas represent the 95% CI of average daily mobility across 
European regions, weighted by 1/number of regions in the corresponding country. Distrust indicates regions, within each country, with trust level below country average.
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Figure A.4: Daily Mobility and Satisfaction in Governments (ESS):
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Source: authors' calculations based on Google mobility data and ESS data on satisfaction with government. Areas represent the 95% CI of average daily mobility across European
regions, weighted by 1/number of regions in the corresponding country. Dissatisfaction indicates regions, within each country, with satisfaction level below country average.
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